There have certainly been fundamental changes in the ways in which nation-states, particularly powerful nation-states, wage war in the post–Cold War era. When the United States entered the Gulf War in 1990, it marked the beginning of a change in the way in which the US waged war. In its invasion of Iraq, rather than focusing on ground troops, the United States engaged in the largest aerial bombing campaign in history. This war marked the shift away from ground troops as a main method of attack and toward aerial bombings, drone strikes, and other advanced technology that requires less direct involvement of on-the-ground soldiers.
The Gulf War was also nicknamed the "Video Game War" because of the daily broadcasting of war imagery by US media stations which had live reporting from on-the-ground journalists. The emergence of this kind of war reporting marked a significant shift in how the public viewed war. The public became more desensitized to the scenes of destruction and death, which also became a focus of discussion during the post-2003 Iraq and Afghanistan wars. With desensitization, fewer ground troops, and more advanced and remotely controlled military technology, war has indeed begun to mimic video games.
For superpower countries, wars don't have nearly the same substantial effect on the domestic economy or the daily lives of the public as wars fought prior to the end of the Cold War. Instead, one could argue that the United States is in a constant mode of warfare, in which it frames a narrative of securing democracy around the world through deciding to define an organization or group of people as "terrorists" and then invading a country to "liberate" the population.
To answer this question, we must first arrive at an acceptable understanding of what “fundamental change” means in terms of waging war. Fundamental change can come about in one of the following ways:
Change in the means by which parties prosecute wars against each other. This can come about, for example, through technological advancements that change the economic and political calculus by which military and political decision agents evaluate the potential costs and benefits of committing resources to war.
Change in the identities of parties engaged in warfare. The traditional field of war in the pre–Cold War era was between nation-states or alliances of nation-states. The Cold War era witnessed the rise of a category called proxy nations—third parties allied with one or the other superpower. In the post–Cold War era (i.e., since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991), the role of other actors has become increasingly prominent. These include, for example, groups united by extreme religious and/or ethnic identity conducting war by means of terrorism.
Change in the motivations for waging or not waging war. Arguably the biggest motivating factor during the Cold War era was nuclear deterrence, which raised the potential cost of waging war (against nuclear-equipped enemies) beyond acceptable limits (although there were sufficient examples of near-misses during this period as well). The nuclear deterrent remains potent in the post–Cold War era. Another motivational change comes about in the form of “war by other means.” The post–Cold War world is an economically interlinked one where the field of battle may well take the form of trade and monetary policies more than that of conventional warfare.
By this definition of fundamental change, one can reasonably defend either side of the question, but perhaps a stronger case can be made that the post–Cold War period has witnessed a fundamental change in the nature of war. For example, the US has technically been “at war” for a large part of the entire post–Cold War period, including the longest wartime commitment on record (in Afghanistan). Yet being “at war” in 2018 implies a different level of national commitment than it did in 1917 or 1941. Much of this has to do with technological advancement; war can be waged precisely against a configuration of multiple adversaries via smart weaponry that reduces the commitment of human lives. This fundamentally changes the range of choices—the motivations—policymakers have at their disposal in making military commitments.
Keep in mind, though, that the fundamental changes which have taken place up to and through the post–Cold War period have not eliminated the traditional desire by nation states to expand territory and influence around the world. “War by other means,” such as economic influence, may be our default way of thinking, for example, about how the US, China, the European Union, and the former Soviet Union deal with their inter-relationships and differences. But the first decade of the twentieth century was also a period of unusually close global inter-linkages and multinational trade. It made no economic sense for the Great Powers to go to war in 1914—yet go to war they did. The fundamental changes of the postwar period do not completely preclude a possible return to more traditional modes of warfare.
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